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This paper examines the relationship between government size and fiscal cent­
ralization with specific focus on the separate influences of centralism and fragmenta­
tion on the size of the public sector in the United States. The empirical findings at the 
national level provide support to the hypothesis that fiscal decentralization leads to a 
smaller government. The findings at the state and local levels, however, show no 
empirical relationship between government size and the degree of centralization. 
I. INTRODUCTION ment. Examination of only state or county government 
levels is typical and addresses only the 'fragmentation' issue 
This paper addresses the issue of whether or not govern­ which measures the degree of competition between non­
ments act as monopolists when competitors are weak or central governments. However, there also exists the 'cent­
absent. At stake are issues regarding the behaviour of ralization' issue which poses the possibility that central 
government officials and institutions and whether or not governments influence intergovernmental competitive en­
government should be modelled along the lines of tradi­ vironments by affecting the ability of taxpayers to discipline 
tional microtheory. One end of the debate argues that governments through taxpayer-flight. Holding total govern­
whenever intergovernmental competition is weak, govern­ ment size constant, this centralization issue suggests that, 
ments act as self-interested monopolists that seek to expand because a relatively large central government weakens the 
their influence over the economy. Greater monopolization, relative importance of non-central governments to tax­
or centralization, is argued to lead to larger, more inefficient payers, the benefits to disciplining governments through 
government. Taxpayer-flight away from high-tax, inefficient taxpayer-mobility is inversely related to central government 
political jurisdictions is seen to be more difficult the greater size. Exclusion of the central government removes one 
is the degree of government monopolization. 2 The other end potentially important factor that describes the competitive 
of the debate argues that, because production is subject to environment of governments. 
substantial economies of scale, more centralized government Many studies in fiscal federalism implicitly assume that 
should be associated with smaller, more efficient govern­ the central government exerts no competitive influence on 
ment. While both sides may contain elements of truth, the intergovernmental relationships. We argue that this as­
net effect of centralization on government size suggests sumption merits further investigation.3 State cross-sectional 
which of the views dominate the relationship between data on the activities of local, state and federal governments 
government size and fiscal structure. are examined in order to study whether the centralization 
This paper argues that the research methodologies of hypothesis is sensitive to inclusion of the central govern­
many previous studies of the centralization hypothesis are ment. Our conclusions suggest that the literature's assump­
suspect because they have not examined all units of govern- tion that central governments play an insignificant role in 
IThe views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and should not be attributed to the US Department of Treasury.
 
20f course, it is possible that both greater monopolization and immobility might be correlated in practice, as far as both are dependent on
 
the geographical size of government.
 
30ates (1989) suggests further study of the centralization hypothesis along the lines ofsorting out the differences between the fragmentation
 
and centralization aspects of fiscal structure.
 
 intergovernmental competition is incorrect. We conclude 
that differences in support offered by fragmentation and 
decentralization measures of competition suggest that the 
degree of fragmentation, or the degree of competition be­
tween local and state governments, is not as important as the 
share of the central government in the economy. 
II.	 GOVERNMENTAL CENTRALIZAnON 
LITERATURE 
That centralization promotes government expansion fol­
lows from the revenue-maximizing model of government in 
Brennan and Buchanan (1980).4 Discussions of the theoret­
ical framework for this centralization hypothesis may be 
found in Brennan and Buchanan (1980), Oates (1985) and 
Wiseman (1990). Specific discussion of the possibility that 
central governments influence individual migration de­
cisions at the state and local levels of government is con­
tained in Grewal (1988). Briefly, the literature argues that 
intergovernmental competition may act as a constraining 
device on total government size because citizens are believed 
to vote-with-their-feet along the lines of the Tiebout (1956) 
model. It is hypothesized that, when governments are sub­
ject to little competition, political self-interests are promoted 
as evidenced by relatively costly production and high taxes. 
Therefore, this view hypothesizes that fiscal decentralization 
acts as a stimulus to intergovernmental competition, which 
in turn will restrain revenue-maximizing governments. This 
hypothesis is consistent with Niskanen's (1971) model re­
garding monopoly bureaus and a number of empirical 
studies (Ahlbrandt, 1973; DeAllesi, 1974; Boardman and 
Vining, 1989) that indicate that government production is 
less efficient than private production of the same activities. 
Also consistent is the literature which argues that govern­
ments act like monopolists when they attempt to limit entry 
into their markets. DiLorenzo (1981) finds that larger 
government is the result of entry restrictions on single­
purpose special districts. Similar evidence is reported in 
Wagner and Weber (1975) and Wagner and Martin (1978). 
The counter-hypothesis argues that centralization leads 
to lower production costs because decentralized government 
leads to redundancy in production. Oates (1985) argues that, 
to the extent that decentralization reduces the ability of 
governments to exploit economies of scale, higher decentral­
ization will result in larger government budgets. We argue 
that the potential relevancy of this issue must consider two 
factors. First, is government production subject to econom­
ies of scale? Second, even if scale economies exist, would 
the resulting higher government centralization result in 
Brennan and Buchanan's prediction of monopolistic behavi­
our on the part of governments? Therefore, potential trade­
offs between scale economies and greater centralization exist 
and it is not clear a priori which effects dominate the fiscal 
structure-government size relationship. 
Previous empirical evidence on this hypothesis consists of 
many methodologies and levels of data aggregation. Giertz 
(1981) finds a positive relation between tax revenue cent­
ralization (ratio of state-to-state and local tax collections) 
and state and local government expenditures. DiLorenzo 
(1983) finds that greater interjurisdictional competition 
within large cities is associated with lower public service 
costs. DiLorenzo (1983) uses two measures of centralization 
for a sample of 65 of the largest government areas in the 
United States: (1) percentage of total government spending 
in a county government area by the four largest jurisdictions 
and (2) percentage of 'own tax revenue' taken in four largest 
jurisdictions.5 The evidence suggests interjurisdictional 
competition tends to reduce the cost of providing local 
public services, and consequently local government ex­
penditures as well. 
Schneider's (1986) study of 46 large US metropolitan 
areas concludes that the number of suburban municipal 
governments is inversely related to the growth of local 
governments. Alternative measures of local government 
growth are based on total expenditures, common expendi­
tures and the number of social services whereas competition 
is measured as the number of per capita suburban com­
peting governments. 
Examining state and local governments, Oates (1985) and 
Nelson (1986) find no support for the hypothesis that 
government centralization of spending or taxation policies 
affects government size. Nelson (1987) finds support of the 
centralization hypothesis in the case of general-purpose, 
local governments. Raimondo's (1989) study of state and 
local governments reports mixed results when government 
activities are separated into five categories: education, public 
welfare, hospital, highways and 'others'. Using a panel data 
set, Wallis and Oates (1988) find a positive and statistically 
significant relation between state government centralization 
(state's share of taxes and expenditures) and the size of state 
and local governments in the United States. Forbes and 
Zampelli (1989) and Zax (1989) use counties as the unit of 
observation. Forbes and Zampelli (1989) report no support 
for the hypothesis that fiscal structure is related to govern­
ment size whereas Zax (1989) finds evidence in support of the 
hypothesis. 
Relatively few studies include the central government in 
their examinations of the hypothesis. Some studies exclude 
4Another counterhypothesis is discussed in Anderson and Tollison (1988) which argues that less competition is associated with less total 
government. One argument is that gains in monopoly power should lower output (assumed equivalent to taxes) and raise prices. While this 
appears inconsistent with the Brennan and Buchanan hypothesis, this hypothesis appears to model the effects of competition within a 
jurisdiction rather than between competing jurisdictions. 
sJurisdictions are defined at the county level and include municipalities, townships, special districts and county governments. 
the central government based on the assumption that tax­
payers do not vote-with-their-feet on the basis of central 
governments. However, because greater centralization may 
reduce taxpayer-incentives to regulate non-central govern­
ments with their mobility, exclusion of the central gov­
ernment ignores this important determinant of the inter­
governmental competitive environment for a given size of 
government. That is, the issue is not whether or not citizens 
vote-with-their-feet on the basis of central government 
activity, but whether or not central government activity 
influences the decisions of taxpayers to regulate non-central 
governments.6 We hypothesize that the larger the central 
government's share of total government acitivity, the lower 
are taxpayer-incentives to regulate non-central governments 
in a Tiebout world. This hypothesis follows from the simple 
fact that, at the margin, greater centralization implies lower 
financial incentives to regulate the resulting smaller non­
central governments. The absolute gains from taxpayer 
mobility may be equally important in that there may exist 
some threshold level of total tax payments that must be 
reached before taxpayers find it financially beneficial to 
regulate government through their mobility. 
Another reason why previous studies may exclude central 
governments from their examinations is based on the as­
sumption that certain activities, like national defence, are 
not subject to intergovernmental competition. To the extent 
that national security is identically provided across all states, 
citizens would not be concerned with voting-with-their-feet 
in response to monopoly provision; at least, with respect to 
mobility within one country. However, this argument only 
applies to those activities which are truly uniform and non­
redistributive in nature. Some portion of defence outlays 
fund military bases, research contracts and jobs in politi­
cians' districts and therefore, to the extent burdens and 
benefits of taxpayers are not uniform, such activities may 
affect taxpayer-perception of government performance. In 
addition, some portion of national defence competes with 
other central and non-central government activities and 
may crowd-out redistributive activities of those govern­
ments. Therefore, the assumption that all centrally provided 
goods are pure 'public goods' which have no local aspects 
seems rather simplifying. 
An additional reason suggests the importance of the role 
of central governments in the determination of total govern­
ment size. Central governments often guarantee themselves 
specific portions of taxpayer's income. For example, the US 
central government is granted monopoly rights in Social 
Security - a programme that, in 1988, accounted for 25% of 
the tax collections of local, state and federal governments. 7 If 
such government monopolies reduce the range of inter­
governmental competition, they may lead to larger total 
government. Moreover, to the extent that a government 
monopoly behaves like a private monopoly, monopolized 
programmes may be administered at higher costs than if the 
government-provider was more concerned about competi­
tors. As discussed below, another way that central govern­
ments may affect intergovernmental competition is through 
a system of intergovernmental grants. 
The time series methodologies of Marlow (1988) and 
Grossman (1989) support Brennan and Buchanan's cent­
ralization hypothesis in the case of total government (local, 
state and federal) in the United States. One possible problem 
with the time series approach is that it necessitates aggrega­
ting local, state and federal spending into single observations 
for each year. In the United States, for example, this means 
that spending by the 50 state governments is aggregated into 
one number in each year. This is potentially a problem when 
there exist significant differences within each state in such 
factors as demographics, fiscal structure and fiscal rules (e.g., 
balanced budget rules or tax limitations). 
The cross-country samples of Oates (1972) and Oates 
(1985) avoid the above aggregation problem. Oates (1972) 
regressed total government tax revenues as a percentage of 
national income on measures of centralization and income 
on a cross-section of 57 countries. Centralization, as meas­
ured by the central government's share of tax revenues, 
exhibited a negative sign, but was not statistically significant. 
Oates (1985) analysed Spearman rank correlations and 
regressions on a cross-country sample of 43 countries drawn 
from the early 19805. Two subsamples were also considered: 
18 industrialized and 25 non-industrialized countries. The 
former exhibit relatively larger government sectors and 
considerably less centralization than the latter. For the full 
sample, Oates (1985) finds highly significant and negative 
rank correlation between government size and centraliz­
ation. However, for each subsample, there is not significant 
rank correlation and Oates (1985) suggests that this is a 
result of substantial differences between the subsamples. In 
regressions using population, intergovernmental grants, per 
capita income and urbanization as control variables, Oates 
(1985) finds no relationship between government size and 
centralization. • 
Joulfaian and Marlow (1990) report evidence in support 
of the centralization hypothesis from examinations of cross­
state data on federal, state and local government activities in 
the United States. Although this study avoids the problems 
associated with the time series methodologies of Marlow 
(1988) and Grossman (1989), two important issues remain to 
be addressed. First, to what extent are empirical results 
regarding the centralization hypothesis sensitive to the role 
of the federal government? That is, does the fact that most 
previous studies exclude the central government a reason for 
6 Actually, the fact that there exists immigration may suggest that citizens do vote-with-their-feet on the basis ofcentral government policies
 
as well.
 
7Data obtained from Table no. 429 in the US Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States (1988).
 
why they often find no support for the hypothesis? Because 
the present study tests the hypothesis on two separate data 
sets (exclusive and inclusive of the federal government), it is 
able directly to examine this issue. Second, to what extent do 
both centralization and fragmentation explain government 
size? The present study is the first to examine the fragmenta­
tion and centralization issues together within a data set that 
includes all levels of government. As argued in Oates (1989), 
it is appropriate to distinguish between the roles of the 
central and non-central governments when examining the 
hypothesis that fiscal structure influences government size. 
Our methodology distinguishes between these two separate 
factors by including them together in the same regression 
equation.s Evidence from both centralization and frag­
mentation measures may suggest the relative importance of 
the central government in the competitive environment 
between central and non-central governments. 
III.	 TESTS OF THE DECENTRALIZAnON 
HYPOTHESIS 
We examine two specifications for equations describing 
total government size. In the first specification, total govern­
ment size is measured relative to gross state product, a 
measure of state income, and therefore reflects the 
government's relative share of the total economy. The 
second specification measures government size as per capita 
government expenditure. Both specifications measure 
government activity in terms of expenditures based on the 
argument in Marlow (1988) that, when governments run 
budget deficits, expenditures offer a more complete measure 
of government size than similar measures utilizing govern­
ment tax revenues.9 
The following testing framework is consistent with models 
in Oates (1985), Marlow (1988), and 10ulfaian and Marlow 
(1990). 
GOVl=f(POP, URBAN, PCY, GRANTS, FRAG, DEC) 
(1) 
GOV2=f(POP, URBAN, PCY, GRANTS, FRAG, DEC) 
(2) 
where 
GOVl (govt. expenditure)/(gross state product) 
GOV2 (govt. expenditure)/population 
POP population in WOOs 
URBAN percentage of population living within metro 
area 
PCY per capita income in 1982 
GRANTS = (federal grants)/(state and local govt. re­
venues) 
FRAGl (local govt. expenditures)/(state and local 
govt. expenditures) 
FRAG2 number of local governments 
DEC (local and state govt. expenditures)/(local, 
state and federal govt. expenditures) 
Equations are estimated by ordinary least squares and the 
unit of observation is the state for three separate years: 1983, 
1984 and 1985.10 Time periods are based on ease of avail­
ability. Due to their relatively large government sectors and 
centralization, Alaska and Hawaii are excluded.11 A logistic 
transformation of LGOVl =log«GOVl/(1-GOVl)) was 
considered since GOVl must range from 0 to 1; however, the 
results do not differ from those reported here and therefore 
are not displayed here. 
As discussed above, government size is defined two ways: 
GOVl and GOV2. GOVl is the ratio of government ex­
penditure over gross state product and GO V2 is the ratio of 
government expenditure per capita. Federal government 
expenditures are allocated to each state to include data on 
salaries and wages, direct payments for individuals and 
procurement. Not included are net interest on the Federal 
government debt, international payments, foreign aid and 
expenditures for various agencies such as the Central In­
telligence Agency and the National Security Agency. How­
ever, the exclusions are relatively small since, for the years 
examined in this study, these data reflect approximately 
97% of all federal expenditures (exclusive of net interest 
payments).12 
8While 10ulfaian and Marlow (1990) include a measure of fragmentation in their study, they argue that it is really another measure of
 
centralization. Consequently, they never include separate measures of centralization and fragmentation in the same regression equation.
 
9'fhe argument that government expenditures are better measures than government tax revenues is also consistent with the Ricardian
 
Equivalence theory that hypothesizes that voters properly discount all measures of government finance - taxation and debt issue - when
 
they view government activity.
 
lOData on federal expenditures and grants are obtained from US Department of Commerce 'Federal Expenditures by State' (1983,1984 and
 
1985). Data on state and local expenditures, revenues, per capita real income, population and urban population are obtained from various
 
issues of the Statistical Abstract a/the United States. Data on gross state product are obtained from US Department of Commerce 'Gross
 
State Product by Industry, 1963-1986' Survey of Current Business 68: 30-46, May 1988.•
 
I1This is a common practice in previous studies. Inclusion ofHawaii and Alaska results in large increases in statistical significance - both F­

scores ofthe estimating equation and t-scores on the DEC coefficient. In addition, Washington, DC is also excluded following the 10ulfaian
 
and Marlow (1990) argument that it is an outlier: its government sector and degree ofcentralization are substantially larger than any of the
 
50 states.
 
12For fiscal years 1983, 1984 and 1985, these data reflect, respectively, 97%, 98% and 96% of total federal expenditures less net interest
 
payments by the federal government. The percentages are calculated from data obtained from the 'Federal Expenditures by State' (1983,
 
1984 and 1985) and the Economic Report o/the President 1990.
 
Population POP and per capita real income PCY control, 
respectively, for scale effects and Wagner's Law, or that the 
demand for government activity is income elastic. Both are 
expected to exert positive influences on government size. 
The percentage of population that is urban URBAN con­
trols for urbanization that may positively affect government 
size by raising the demand for infrastructure and public 
services. 13 
The hypothesized signs on GRANTS are positive since, 
following Logan (1986) and Grossman (1989), grants may 
positively influence total government size by two means: 
fostering fiscal illusion and enhancing the taxation powers of 
the central government. The fiscal illusion argument states 
that, because grants allow state and local governments to 
spend without taxing their citizens, the demand for state and 
local government spending may rise with growing usage of 
grants. 14 That is, residents of state and local jurisdictions 
may be misled into believing that state and local government 
expenditures are cheaper when they are funded through the 
central government's grant programme. The other possible 
effect from grants is their influence on the monopoly­
taxation powers of the central government. The argument 
here is that grants allow governments to circumvent, to 
some degree, the ability of taxpayers to flee 'high-tax' state 
and local governments. In this sense, grants are viewed as 
collusive arrangements between governments that serve to 
raise the monopoly-taxation powers of the central govern­
ment. 
Consistent with the Brennan and Buchanan hypothesis, 
grant usage is hypothesized to lead to larger total govern­
ment. No support for the hypothesis that grants affect the 
size of government is found in Oates (1985), Nelson (1987) 
and 10ulfaian and Marlow (1990). However, Winer (1983), 
Logan (1986), SchwaUie (1989) and Grossman (1989) report 
evidence in support of the hypothesis that grants affect 
government size. 
FRAG1, the local government's share of total government 
spending, measures the competitive properties of local and 
state governments when total government size is defined as 
the sum of local and state government spending. The 
Brennan and Buchanan hypothesis predicts that higher 
levels of FRAG1 are expected to be inversely related to 
government size. FRAG1 also measures decentralization 
when total government size is defined as the sum of state and 
local governments, i.e., when the federal government is 
13Musgrave and Musgrave (1989, p. 124) make this argument. 
excluded. FRAG2 is an alternative measure which is defined 
as the number of local governments within each state. This 
variable is obtained from the Statistical Abstract of the 
United States (1985) and is only measured every five years. 
Consequently, its value for 1982 was employed here; note, 
however, its value does not exhibit wide variation over short 
periods of time. The Brennan and Buchanan hypothesis 
predicts that FRAG2 exerts an inverse influence on total 
government size. Decentralization DEC, the share of total 
government controlled by local and state governments, 
measures the competitive properties of government when 
total government size is defined as the sum oflocal, state and 
federal government spending. The Brennan and Buchanan 
hypothesis predicts that DEC will be inversely related to 
total government size. 15 
To indicate the variation in our sample, Table 1 displays 
state-by-state values ofGOV1, FRAGl and FRAG2 for 1985. 
Values of GOV1 and FRAG1 are displayed for our two 
definitions of government: with and without the federal 
sector. For simplicity, other variables are not displayed here. 
Casual comparison of GOV1 between samples with and 
without the federal sector indicate relatively wide variation 
in the role that the federal sector plays in each state. The 
values ofFRAG1 and FRAG2 also indicate wide variation in 
these variables. 
Empirical tests 
Table 2 displays regression results based on the expenditures 
of state and local governments. POP never influences the 
size of government. URBAN exerts a statistically significant 
(5% level) inverse influence on GOV2 in 1983 and 1985; it 
exerts no influence in equations using GOV1. For all years, 
PC Y exerts positive and statistically significant influences 
on GO V2. PCY is never statistically significant in the cases 
of GOV1. GRANTS are only found to exert statistically 
significant negative influences on GO V2 in 1983 and 1985. 
While all coefficients on FRAG1 are negative, as hypothes­
ized by the decentralization hypothesis, they are indifferent 
from zero. The coefficients on FRAG2 never exert statist­
ically signifiant effects on either GO V1 or GO V2 and are not 
displayed here. DEC is not included here because it includes 
the federal government sector in its definition of government 
structure. The F-scores in Table 2 find that we canJ;lot reject 
the null hypothesis that all coefficients, in equations using 
14 Another complication concerns the so-called 'fly-paper' effect which argues that money tends to 'stick' where it is sent. If federal grants to 
state and local governments foster growth in state and local governments, then grants may also affect the degree of government 
centralization. 
ISH is noted that a potential problem exists with testing the relationship in this manner. If government expenditures are based, to some 
extent, on standardization formulae for housing, welfare, health, etc., then 'low-level' governments may receive relatively large expenditures 
from 'high-level' governments. In this case, the dependent variable may be inversely related to decentralization, but not be consistent with 
the Brennan and Buchanan model. While this possibility of spurious correlation exists, it potentially affects studies of any aggregation. 
Following Marlow (1988), both FRAG and DEC are expenditure-based because, when governments-run deficits, revenue-based measures 
miss a substantial amount of government activity. The federal government has consistently run deficits since 1969. 
Table 1. Values of selected variables for ]985 
Without federal sector With federal sector 
State GOV] FRAGJ FRAG2 GOV] DEC 
Alabama 0.12 0.30 1018 0.36 0.33 
Alaska 0.20 0.07 156 0.32 0.63 
Arizona 0.13 0.42 452 0.33 0.38 
Arkansas 0.10 0.30 1424 0.33 0.30 
California 0.12 0.33 4102 0.31 0.37 
Colorado 0.12 0.45 1544 0.29 0.40 
Connecticut 0.09 0.35 479 0.30 0.31 
Delaware 0.12 0.25 217 0.28 0.44 
Florida 0.12 0.45 969 0.34 0.34 
Georgia 0.10 0.40 1268 0.29 0.35 
Hawaii 0.12 0.20 18 0.37 0.32 
Idaho 0.11 0.33 1018 0.33 0.33 
Illinois 0.10 0.41 6467 0.25 0.42 
Indiana 0.10 0.35 2865 0.28 0.37 
Iowa 0.13 0.37 1871 0.31 0.42 
Kansas 0.11 0.45 3795 0.33 0.35 
Kentucky 0.10 0.26 1241 0.29 0.34 
Louisiana 0.11 0.37 468 0.26 0.32 
Maine 0.11 0.30 806 0.36 0.31 
Maryland 0.12 0.38 439 0.42 0.29 
Massachusetts 0.11 0.28 798 0.32 0.33 
Michigan 0.13 0.38 2643 0.29 0.46 
Minnesota 0.14 0.37 3529 0.30 0.46 
Mississippi 0.11 0.31 858 0.37 0.31 
Missouri 0.09 0.39 3117 0.37 0.24 
Montana 0.14 0.39 1029 0.38 0.36 
Nebraska 0.11 0.43 3324 0.30 0.38 
Nevada 0.11 0.44 184 0.28 0.39 
New Hampshire 0.08 0.44 517 0.27 0.31 
New Jersey 0.11 0.37 1591 0.27 0.42 
New Mexico 0.12 0.22 319 0.39 0.30 
New York 0.14 0.44 3249 0.31 0.46 
North Carolina 0.10 0.30 905 0.26 0.38 
North Dakota 0.13 0.22 2795 0.38 0.34 
Ohio 0.11 0.38 3393 0.28 0.39 
Oklahoma 0.11 0.35 1702 0.29 0.38 
Oregon 0.13 0.40 1454 0.32 0.42 
Pennsylvania 0.11 0.37 5198 0.31 0.35 
Rhode Island 0.14 0.27 122 0.36 0.38 
South Carolina 0.11 0.26 645 0.35 0.32 
South Dakota 0.12 0.38 1767 0.37 0.32 
Tennessee 0.09 0.39 913 0.29 0.32 
Texas 0.09 0.47 4180 0.24 0.39 
Utah 0.13 0.33 504 0.35 0.38 
Vermont 0.12 0.26 664 0.30 0.39 
Virginia 0.10 0.36 407 0.38 0.26 
Washington 0.13 0.33 1734 0.36 0.36 
West Virginia 0.12 0.28 633 0.34 0.37 
Wisconsin 0.14 0.34 2592 0.30 0.47 
Wyoming 0.13 0.36 395 0.25 0.51 
Mean 0.12 0.35 1636 0.32 0.37 
Standard deviation 0.02 0.08 1445 0.04 0.07 
Minimum 0.08 0.07 18 0.24 0.24 
Maximum 0.20 0.47 6467 0.42 0.63 
Table 2. Fiscal decentralization - government size relation: state and local government expenditures 
1983 1984 1985 
Dependent 
variable GOVl GOV2 GOVl GOV2 GOVl GOV2 
Constant 0.13< 1.48b 0.12< 1.04" 0.14< 1.74b 
3.81 2.61 3.74 1.70 4.07 2.49 
POP -5 x 10- 7 -2 X 10- 6 -5 X 10- 7 -4 X 10- 6 -2 X 10- 7 -6 X 10- 7 
URBAN 
0.90 
7 x 10- 5 
0.20 
-O.ool b 
1.02 
4xlO- 5 
0.39 
-0.001 
0.45 
1 x 10- 5 
0.Q1 
-O.ool b 
0.42 2.35 0.27 1.52 0.01 1.82 
PCY 3 x 10- 7 1 X 10- 4 2 X 10- 6 1 X 10- 4 < -9 X 10- 8 1 X 10- 4 < 
GRANTS 
0.16 
-0.01 
3.95 
-4.11< 
0.94 
-0.01 
3.89 
-2.55 
0.01 
-0.Q1 
3.23 
-3.70b 
0.98 2.93 0.64 1.50 0.54 2.08 
FRAGl -0.001 -0.58 -0.004 -0.84 -0.003 -0.71 
0.34 0.94 1.63 1.56 0.79 0.87 
F 0.55 6.88< 0.85 4.96< 0.21 4.34< 
n 48 48 48 48 48 48 
Adj RSQ -0.05 0.38 -0.02 0.30 -0.09 0.26 
s.e.e. 0.0014 0.2502 0.0014 0.2794 0.0015 0.3155 
Absolute value of t-statistics below estimated coefficients. 
GOV1=(state and local expenditure)/GSP 
GO V2 = (state and local expenditure)/population 
POP = population in lOoos 
URBAN = percentage resident population living within metro area 
PCY=per capita personal income ($1972) 
GRANTS = federal grants/state and local revenues 
FRAG1=local expenditures/state and local expenditures 
"Significant for a 2-tailed test at 10% 
bSignificant for a 2-tailed test at 5% 
<Significant for a 2-tailed test at 1% 
Table 3. Fiscal decentralization - government size relation: state, local and federal government expenditures 
1983 1984 1985 
Dependent 
variable GOVl GOV2 GOVl GOV2 GOVl GOV2 
Constant 0.47< 3.69< 0.42< 2.96b 0.42< 3.68b 
5.56 3.06 5.08 2.09 5.06 2.44 
POP -2 x 10- 6 -2 X 10- 5 -2 X 10- 6 -2 X 10- 5 -lx1O- 6 -2xlO- 5 
1.40 1.04 1.46 1.07 1.03 0.88 
URBAN 5 x 10- 4 -0.001 5 x 10- 4 -2 X 10- 3 3 X 10- 4 -0.001 
1.32 1.05 1.37 0.38 0.79 0.88 
PCY 1 x 10- 6 3 X 10- 4 < -1 X 10- 6 3 X 10- 4 < -2 X 10- 6 3 X 10- 4 < 
0.24 4.49 0.24 3.98 0.38 4.03 
GRANTS 0.01 -4.00 0.16 -0.62 0.22 -1.86 
0.33 1.42 0.80 0.18 0.12 0.52 
DEC -0.49< -4.20< -0.43< - 3.73b -0.40< -3.66b 
5.00 3.01 4.77 2.43 4.10 2.09 
F 7.66< 7.61< 7.01< 5.65< 6.24< 5.21< 
n 48 48 48 48 48 48 
Adj RSQ 0.42 0.41 0.39 0.33 0.36 0.31 
s.e.e. 0.0035 0.4976 0.0033 0.5612 0.0034 0.6150 
Absolute value of t-statistics below estimated coefficients.
 
GOVl = (state, local and federal expenditure)/GSP
 
GOV2=(state, local and federal expenditure)/population
 
POP = population in lOOOs
 
URBAN = percentage resident population living within metro area
 
PCY=per capita personal income ($1972)
 
GRANTS = federal grants/state and local revenues
 
DEC = (state + local expend.)/(federal, state + local expend.)
 
"Significant for a 2-tailed test at 10%
 
bSignificant for a 2-tailed test at 5%
 
<Significant for a 2-tailed test at 1%
 
 
Table 4. Fiscal decentralization - government size relation: state, local and federal expenditures 
1983 1984 
Dependent 
variable GOVl GOV2 GOVl GOV2 
Constant 0.49< 4.67< 0.45< 
5.28 3.66 5.28 
POP -2 x 10- 6 -lxlO- s -2 x 10- 6 
1.27 0.74 1.54 
URBAN 5 x 10- 6 -0.001 4 x 10- 4 
1.23 1.32 1.24 
PCY -7xlO- 7 3 X 10- 4< 1 X 10- 6 
0.13 4.91 0.29 
GRANTS 0.002 -5.95" 0.01 
0.11 2.04 0.45 
FRAGl -0.005 -2.31" -0.01 
0.56 1.92 1.29 
DEC -0.48< -4.11< -0.44< 
4.94 3.04 4.96 
F 6.33c 7.36c 6.22c 
n 48 48 48 
Adj RSQ 0.40 0.45 0.40 
s.e.e. 0.0035 0.4824 0.0032 
Absolute value of t-statistics below estimated coefficients.
 
GOVl = (state, local and federal expenditure)/GSP
 
GOV2=(state, local and federal expenditure)/population
 
POP=population in WOOs
 
URBAN = percentage resident population living within metro area
 
PC Y= per capita personal income ($1972)
 
GRANTS = federal grants/state and local revenues
 
FRAG1= local expend/(state + local expend)
 
DEC = (state + local expend.)/(federal, state + local expend.)
 
"Significant for a 2-tailed test at 10%
 
bSignificant for a 2-tailed test at 5%
 
<Significant for a 2-tailed test at 1%
 
GO VI, are zero. Although we reject the same null hypothesis 
for equations using GOV2, there remains no statistical 
relationship between government size and decentralization 
based on this sample of state and local governments. 
Table 3 displays regression results based on the ex­
penditures of local, state and federal governments. FRAGI 
and FRAG2 are excluded here in order to provide appropri­
ate comparisons with earlier studies of the federal govern­
ment which only considered DEC. POP, URBAN and 
GRANTS never influence the size of government. For all 
years, PC Y exerts positive and statistically significant influ­
ences on GO V2. PCY is never,statistically significant in the 
cases of GOVI. GRANTS are only found to exert statist­
ically significant negative influences on GOV2 in 1983 and 
1985. Strong support of the hypothesis that government 
centralization positively affects the size of government is 
provided since DEC always exerts a statistically significant 
inverse effect on both measures of government size. 
Table 4 is identical to Table 3 except that it includes 
FRAGI together with DEC. Results regarding POP, 
1985 
GOVl GOV2 
3.30b 0.46< 4.61< 
2.33 5.11 2.85 
-2xlO- S -lxlO- 6 -lxlO- s 
1.14 0.90 0.72 
-3 X 10- 3 3 X 10- 4 -0.001 
0.50 0.69 1.03 
3 X 10- 4 < -8 X 10- 7 3 X 10- 4< 
4.12 0.20 4.27 
-1.70 0.16 -3.26 
0.47 0.79 0.89 
-1.27 -0.01 -2.30 
1.16 1.11 1.47 
-4.05b -0.40c -3.66b 
2.61 4.11 2.13 
4.97< 5.43C 4.83<
 
48 48 48
 
0.34 0.36 0.33 
0.5589 0.0034 0.6067 
URBAN and GRANTS remain the same; however, 
GRANTS now exert an inverse and marginally statistical 
influence on GOVI in 1983. FRAGI exerts a statistically 
significant (10% level) inverse influence on GOV2 only in 
1983. DEC continues to exhibit statistically significant and 
inverse relationships for all years and both measures of 
government size. 
Table 5 considers the alternative measure of fragmenta­
tion, FRAG2, defined as the number of local governments. 
Similar political competition definitions have been con­
sidered in Oates (1985), Forbes and Zampelli (1989~ Zax 
(1989) and Joulfaian and Marlow (1990). The general results 
regarding POP, URBAN, PCY, GRANTS and DEC remain 
the same as before. However, while the coefficient of FRAGI 
was statistically significant and negative only in the case of 
1983 (with GOV2), the coefficient of FRAG2 is statistically 
significant and negative in two cases: 1983 and 1984 (with 
GOV2). Therefore, FRAG2 offers slightly greater support 
that fragmentation influences government size. 
Table 5. Fiscal decentralization - government size relation: state, local and federal government expenditures 
1983 1984 
Dependent 
variable GO V] GOV2 GO V] GOV2 
Constant 0.48< 3.91< 0.42< 3.06b 
5.56 3.35 5.10 2.23 
POP -I x 10- 6 9 X 10- 6 -9 X 10- 7 6 X 10- 6 
URBAN 
0.68 
4 x 10-4 
0.42 
-0.001 
0.62 
4 x 10- 4 
0.26 
-0.001 
PCY 
1.09 
-9 x 10- 7 
1.61 
3 X 10- 4 
1.08 
-6xl0- 7 
0.87 
3 X 10-4< 
0.19 4.81 0.15 4.27 
GRANTS 0.01 -4.73­ 0.14 -1.24 
FRAG2 
0.24 
-3xlO- 6 
1.73 
-I x 1O- 4b 
0.71 
-3xlO- 6 
0.36 
-1 X 10-4-
0.66 2.05 0.89 1.87 
DEC -0.48< -3.95" -0.41 < -3.27b 
4.89 2.93 4.55 2.17 
F 6.37< 7.53< 5.95< 5.57< 
n 48 48 48 48 
Adj RSQ 0.41 0.45 0.39 0.37 
s.e.e. 0.0035 0.4796 0.0033 0.5453 
Absolute value of t-statistics below estimated coefficients.
 
GO V] = (state, local and federal expenditure)jGSP
 
GOV2=(state, local and federal expenditure)/population
 
POP=population in lO00s
 
URBAN = percentage resident population living within metro area
 
PC Y = per capita personal income ($1972)
 
GRANTS = federal grants/state and local revenues
 
FRAG2=number of local governments
 
DEC = (state + local expend.)/(federal, state + local expend.)
 
-Significant for a 2-tailed test at 10%
 
bSignificant for a 2-tailed test at 5%
 
<Significant for a 2-tailed test at 1%
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The present work suggests that studies of the relation 
between fiscal structure and government size that exclude 
the central government may be based on incomplete meas­
ures of intergovernmental competition. The Brennan and 
Buchanan model is strongly supported by our measure of 
centralization: the federal government's share of the total 
government sector. Evidence from two different measures of 
fragmentation offer weaker support of the Brennan and 
Buchanan hypothesis. However, differences in support off­
ered by fragmentation and centralization measures of com­
petition appear to mirror the differences stemming from 
different aggregation schemes. That is, weak support when 
the central sector is excluded may suggest that the degree of 
fragmentation, or the degree of competition between local 
and state governments, is not as important as the share of 
the central government in the economy. 
1985 
GO V] GOV2 
0.43< 3.72b 
5.02 2.49 
-9 X 10- 7 -4 X 10- 6 
0.59 0.14 
3 x 10-4 
-0.001 
0.67 1.21 
-1 X 10- 6 3 X 10-4• 
0.33 4.21 
0.22 -2.13 
1.08 0.60 
-2 X 10- 6 -1 X 10-4 
0.38 1.43 
-0.39< -3.33­
3.97 1.92 
5.11< 4.80< 
48 48 
0.34 0.33 
0.0034 0.6074 
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